

Stone

Smart Contract Audit Report





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# **AUDITED DETAILS**

## | Audited Project

| Project name | Token ticker | Blockchain |  |
|--------------|--------------|------------|--|
| Stone        | ONE          | Ethereum   |  |

## Addresses

| Contract address          | 0x73A83269b9bbAFC427E76Be0A2C1a1db2a26f4C2 |  |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| Contract deployer address | 0x46DaD8f630736C7265849422F943efD77CB8714f |  |

## Project Website

https://civfund.org/stone/

## Codebase

https://etherscan.io/address/0x73A83269b9bbAFC427E76Be0A2C1a1db2a26f4C2#code



## **SUMMARY**

While \$CIV remains the Civilization's ecosystem Store of Value, \$0NE (Stone) plays the role of the utility token of the Civilization ecosystem.

## Contract Summary

#### **Documentation Quality**

Stone provides a very good documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided clearly and structured and also dont have any high risk issue.

#### **Code Quality**

The Overall quality of the basecode is standard.

 Standard solidity basecode and rules are already followed by Stone with the discovery of several low issues.

#### **Test Coverage**

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

## Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 11, 38, 108, 188, 405, 712, 904, 980, 1070, 1197 and 1246.
- SWC-107 | It is recommended to use a reentrancy lock, reentrancy weaknesses detected on lines 828.
- SWC-110 SWC-123 | It is recommended to use of revert(), assert(), and require() in Solidity, and the new REVERT opcode in the EVM on lines 828.
- SWC-113 SWC-128 | It is recommended to implement the contract logic to handle failed calls and block gas limit on lines 828.



## CONCLUSION

We have audited the Stone project released on April 2022 to discover issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in Stone Project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes which might be found in the smart contract.

The security audit report provides a satisfactory result with some low-risk issues.

The issues found in the Stone smart contract code do not pose a considerable risk. The writing of the contract is close to the standard of writing contracts in general. The low-risk issues found are a floating pragma is set, a call to a user-supplied address is executed, multiple calls are executed in the same transaction, and Requirement violation. We recommend specifying a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code. A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). For "A call to a user-supplied address is executed" issue we recommend using an external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behavior. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place.



# **AUDIT RESULT**

| Article                              | Category           | Description   | Result         |  |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---|----------------|--|
| Default Visibility                   | SWC-100<br>SWC-108 | Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously. | PASS           |  |
| Integer Overflow<br>and Underflow    | SWC-101            | If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.                          | PASS           |  |
| Outdated Compiler<br>Version         | SWC-102            | It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.   | PASS           |  |
| Floating Pragma                      | SWC-103            | Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.          | ISSUE<br>FOUND |  |
| Unchecked Call<br>Return Value       | SWC-104            | The return value of a message call should be checked.   | PASS           |  |
| Unprotected Ether<br>Withdrawal      | SWC-105            | Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.                     | PASS           |  |
| SELFDESTRUCT<br>Instruction          | SWC-106            | The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.                                   | it PASS        |  |
| Reentrancy                           | SWC-107            | Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.                              | ISSUE<br>FOUND |  |
| Uninitialized<br>Storage Pointer     | SWC-109            | Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.                      | PASS           |  |
| Assert Violation                     | SWC-110<br>SWC-123 | Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.  |                |  |
| Deprecated Solidity Functions        | SWC-111            | Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.   | PASS           |  |
| Delegate call to<br>Untrusted Callee | SWC-112            | Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.  | PASS           |  |



| DoS (Denial of Service)                | SWC-113<br>SWC-128            | Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.   | ISSUE<br>FOUND |  |
|--|-------------------------------|---|----------------|--|
| Race Conditions                        | SWC-114                       | Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.   |                |  |
| Authorization through tx.origin        | SWC-115                       | tx.origin should not be used for authorization.   | PASS           |  |
| Block values as a proxy for time       | SWC-116                       | Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.   | PASS           |  |
| Signature Unique<br>ID                 | SWC-117<br>SWC-121<br>SWC-122 | Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.   | PASS           |  |
| Incorrect<br>Constructor Name          | SWC-118                       | Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.  | PASS           |  |
| Shadowing State<br>Variable            | SWC-119                       | State variables should not be shadowed.   | PASS           |  |
| Weak Sources of<br>Randomness          | SWC-120                       | Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.  | n PASS         |  |
| Write to Arbitrary<br>Storage Location | SWC-124                       | The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.   | PASS           |  |
| Incorrect<br>Inheritance Order         | SWC-125                       | When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/. | PASS           |  |
| Insufficient Gas<br>Griefing           | SWC-126                       | Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.   |                |  |
| Arbitrary Jump<br>Function             | SWC-127                       | As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.   | PASS           |  |



| Typographical<br>Error        | SWC-129            | A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.                                     | PASS |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--|------|
| Override control<br>character | SWC-130            | Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract. | PASS |
| Unused variables              | SWC-131<br>SWC-135 | Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.   | PASS |
| Unexpected Ether balance      | SWC-132            | Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.   |      |
| Hash Collisions<br>Variable   | SWC-133            | Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.                                   | PASS |
| Hardcoded gas<br>amount       | SWC-134            | The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.  | PASS |
| Unencrypted<br>Private Data   | SWC-136            | It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.   |      |



# **SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

| Started          | Sunday Apr 24 2022 12:59:58 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) |  |  |
|------------------|---|--|--|
| Finished         | Monday Apr 25 2022 22:47:07 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) |  |  |
| Mode             | Standard  |  |  |
| Main Source File | Stone.sol   |  |  |

# Detected Issues

| ID      | Title  | Severity | Status       |
|---------|--|----------|--------------|
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.                            | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-107 | A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.       | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-113 | MULTIPLE CALLS ARE EXECUTED IN THE SAME TRANSACTION. | low      | acknowledged |
| SWC-123 | REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.                               | low      | acknowledged |



LINE 11

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
10
11 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
12
13 /*
14 * @dev Provides information about the current execution context, including the
15
```



LINE 38

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
37
38 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
39
40 /**
41 * @dev Contract module which provides a basic access control mechanism, where
42
```



**LINE 108** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
107
108 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
109
110 /**
111 * @dev Interface of the ERC20 standard as defined in the EIP.
112
```



**LINE 188** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
187
188 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
189
190 /**
191 * @dev Wrappers over Solidity's arithmetic operations with added overflow
192
```



**LINE 405** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
404
405 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
406
407
408
409
```



**LINE** 712

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
711
712 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
713
714 /**
715 * @dev Collection of functions related to the address type
716
```



**LINE 904** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
903
904 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
905
906
907
908
```



**LINE 980** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
979

980 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;

981

982 /**

983 * @dev Contract module which allows children to implement an emergency stop

984
```



**LINE 1070** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.4.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
1069
1070 pragma solidity >=0.4.0 <0.8.0;
1071
1072 /// @title Contains 512-bit math functions
1073 /// @notice Facilitates multiplication and division that can have overflow of an intermediate value without any loss of precision
1074
```



**LINE 1197** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
1196
1197 pragma solidity >=0.7.0;
1198
1199 /// @title Optimized overflow and underflow safe math operations
1200 /// @notice Contains methods for doing math operations that revert on overflow or underflow for minimal gas cost
1201
```



**LINE 1246** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.6"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
1245
1246 pragma solidity ^0.7.6;
1247
1248
1249
```



# SWC-107 | A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.

**LINE 828** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

An external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behaviour. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place.

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
827  // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
828  (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.call{ value: value }(data);
829  return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
830  }
831
832
```



# SWC-113 | MULTIPLE CALLS ARE EXECUTED IN THE SAME TRANSACTION.

**LINE 828** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
827  // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
828  (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.call{ value: value }(data);
829  return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
830  }
831
832
```



# SWC-123 | REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.

**LINE 828** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

#### Source File

- Stone.sol

```
// solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
(bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.call{ value: value }(data);
return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
}
```



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This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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