

Wrapped MonetaryUnit
Smart Contract
Audit Report





## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

## | Audited Details

- Audited Project
- Blockchain
- Addresses
- Project Website
- Codebase

## Summary

- Contract Summary
- Audit Findings Summary
- Vulnerabilities Summary

## Conclusion

## | Audit Results

## Smart Contract Analysis

- Detected Vulnerabilities
- Disclaimer
- About Us



## **AUDITED DETAILS**

## | Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain
Wrapped MonetaryUnit	WMUE	Binance Smart Chain

## Addresses

Contract address	0x00abaa93faf8fdc4f382135a7a56f9cf7c3edd21
Contract deployer address	0x600d924195915c9447EdfA1b6Ca3E6A4a353AF64

## Project Website

https://www.monetaryunit.org/

## Codebase

https://bscscan.com/address/0x00abaa93faf8fdc4f382135a7a56f9cf7c3edd21#code



## **SUMMARY**

Wrapped MonetaryUnit (wMUE) is a token on the other blockchains that represents the MonetaryUnit coin at a 1:1 ratio. Users can swap MUE coins for wMUE tokens and use them on different chains.

## Contract Summary

## **Documentation Quality**

Wrapped MonetaryUnit provides a very good documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided clearly and structured and also dont have any high risk issue.

## **Code Quality**

The Overall quality of the basecode is standard.

Standard solidity basecode and rules are already followed by Wrapped MonetaryUnit with the discovery
of several low issues.

#### **Test Coverage**

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

## Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 7, 30, 106, 264, 565, 603, 626, 712, 742, 771, 935, 1040, 1091, 1245, 1307, 1373, 1391, 1426 and 1439.
- SWC-107 | It is recommended to use a reentrancy lock, reentrancy weaknesses detected on lines 1387, 1238 and 1220.
- SWC-110 SWC-123 | It is recommended to use of revert(), assert(), and require() in Solidity, and the new REVERT opcode in the EVM on lines 1387 and 1238.



## CONCLUSION

We have audited the Wrapped MonetaryUnit project released on January 2021 to discover issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in the Wrapped MonetaryUnit Project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes which might be found in the smart contract.

The security audit report provides satisfactory results with low-risk issues.

The issues in the Wrapped MonetaryUnit smart contract code do not pose a considerable risk. The writing of the contract is close to the standard of writing contracts in general. The low-risk issues found are some arithmetic operation issues, a floating pragma is set, a call to a user-supplied address is executed, and a call to a user-supplied address is executed. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code. An external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behaviour. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place. A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).



# **AUDIT RESULT**

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.		
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	PASS	
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.		
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.	ISSUE FOUND	
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.		
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.	PASS	
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.	PASS	
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.	ISSUE FOUND	
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.	PASS	
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.	ISSUE FOUND	
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.	PASS	
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	PASS
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	PASS
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118	Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.	
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.	
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124   user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage		PASS
Incorrect Inheritance Order  When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.		PASS	
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126 Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.		PASS
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	PASS
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.	
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	PASS
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.	
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.	PASS
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	PASS



## **SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

Started	Sunday Jan 03 2021 06:42:34 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Monday Jan 04 2021 22:50:13 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Standard
Main Source File	WrappedMUE.sol

## Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged



SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-107	A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.	low	acknowledged
SWC-107	A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.	low	acknowledged
SWC-107	A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.	low	acknowledged
SWC-123	REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.	low	acknowledged
SWC-123	REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.	low	acknowledged



LINE 7

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
6
7 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
8
9 /*
10 * @dev Provides information about the current execution context, including the
11
```



LINE 30

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
29
30 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
31
32 /**
33 * @dev Interface of the ERC20 standard as defined in the EIP.
34
```



**LINE 106** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
105
106 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
107
108 /**
109 * @dev Wrappers over Solidity's arithmetic operations with added overflow
110
```



**LINE 264** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
263
264 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
265
266 /**
267 * @dev Implementation of the {IERC20} interface.
268
```



**LINE 565** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
564
565 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
566
567 /**
568 * @dev Extension of {ERC20} that allows token holders to destroy both their own
569
```



**LINE 603** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
602
603 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
604
605 /**
606 * @dev Interface of the ERC165 standard, as defined in the
607
```



**LINE 626** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
625
626 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
627
628 /**
629 * @title IERC1363 Interface
630
```



**LINE** 712

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
711
712 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
713
714 /**
715 * @title IERC1363Receiver Interface
716
```



**LINE 742** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
741
742 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
743
744 /**
745 * @title IERC1363Spender Interface
746
```



**LINE 771** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
770
771 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
772
773 /**
774 * @dev Collection of functions related to the address type
775
```



**LINE 935** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
934
935 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
936
937 /**
938 * @dev Library used to query support of an interface declared via {IERC165}.
939
```



**LINE 1040** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1039
1040 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
1041
1042 /**
1043 * @dev Implementation of the {IERC165} interface.
1044
```



**LINE 1091** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1090

1091 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;

1092

1093 /**

1094 * @title ERC1363

1095
```



**LINE 1245** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1244

1245 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;

1246

1247 /**

1248 * @title ERC20Mintable

1249
```



**LINE 1307** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1306
1307 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
1308
1309 /**
1310 * @dev Contract module which provides a basic access control mechanism, where
1311
```



**LINE 1373** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1372

1373 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;

1374

1375 /**

1376 * @title TokenRecover

1377
```



**LINE 1391** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1390

1391 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;

1392

1393 /**

1394 * @title ServiceReceiver

1395
```



**LINE 1426** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1425
1426 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
1427
1428 /**
1429 * @title ServicePayer
1430
```



**LINE 1439** 

## **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1438
1439 pragma solidity ^0.7.0;
1440
1441 /**
1442 * @title WrappedMUE
1443
```



# SWC-107 | A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.

**LINE 1387** 

## **low SEVERITY**

An external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behaviour. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount) public onlyOwner

function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount);

function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount);

function recoverERC20(address).transfer(owner(), tokenAmount);

function recoverERC2
```



# SWC-107 | A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.

**LINE 1238** 

## **low SEVERITY**

An external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behaviour. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1237  }
1238  bytes4 retval = IERC1363Spender(spender).onApprovalReceived(
1239  _msgSender(), amount, data
1240  );
1241  return (retval == _ERC1363_APPROVED);
1242
```



# SWC-107 | A CALL TO A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS IS EXECUTED.

**LINE 1220** 

## **low SEVERITY**

An external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behaviour. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place.

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1219  }
1220  bytes4 retval = IERC1363Receiver(recipient).onTransferReceived(
1221  _msgSender(), sender, amount, data
1222  );
1223  return (retval == _ERC1363_RECEIVED);
1224
```



## SWC-123 | REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.

**LINE 1387** 

## **low SEVERITY**

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount) public onlyOwner

function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount);

function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount);

function recoverERC20(address tokenAddress, uint256 tokenAmount);

function recoverERC20(address).transfer(owner(), tokenAmount);

function recoverE
```



## SWC-123 | REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.

**LINE 1238** 

## **low SEVERITY**

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

## Source File

- WrappedMUE.sol

```
1237  }
1238  bytes4 retval = IERC1363Spender(spender).onApprovalReceived(
1239  _msgSender(), amount, data
1240  );
1241  return (retval == _ERC1363_APPROVED);
1242
```



## **DISCLAIMER**

This report is subject to the terms and conditions (including without limitation, description of services, confidentiality, disclaimer and limitation of liability) set forth in the Services Agreement, or the scope of services, and terms and conditions provided to you ("Customer" or the "Company") in connection with the Agreement. This report provided in connection with the Services set forth in the Agreement shall be used by the Company only to the extent permitted under the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement. This report may not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to, or relied upon by any person for any purposes, nor may copies be delivered to any other person other than the Company, without Sysfixed's prior written consent in each instance.

This report is not, nor should be considered, an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. This report is not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team or project that contracts Sysfixed to perform a security assessment. This report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technologies proprietors, business, business model, or legal compliance.

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report in no way provides investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort. This report represents an extensive assessing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

This report is provided for information purposes only and on a non-reliance basis and does not constitute investment advice. No one shall have any right to rely on the report or its contents, and Sysfixed and its affiliates (including holding companies, shareholders, subsidiaries, employees, directors, officers, and other representatives) (Sysfixed) owe no duty of care.



## **ABOUT US**

Sysfixed is a blockchain security certification organization established in 2021 with the objective to provide smart contract security services and verify their correctness in blockchain-based protocols. Sysfixed automatically scans for security vulnerabilities in Ethereum and other EVM-based blockchain smart contracts. Sysfixed a comprehensive range of analysis techniques—including static analysis, dynamic analysis, and symbolic execution—can accurately detect security vulnerabilities to provide an in-depth analysis report. With a vibrant ecosystem of world-class integration partners that amplify developer productivity, Sysfixed can be utilized in all phases of your project's lifecycle. Our team of security experts is dedicated to the research and improvement of our tools and techniques used to fortify your code.