

Injective Protocol
Smart Contract
Audit Report





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# **AUDITED DETAILS**

# Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain	
Injective Protocol	INJ	Binance Smart Chain	

# Addresses

Contract address	0xa2b726b1145a4773f68593cf171187d8ebe4d495	
Contract deployer address	0xFc19E4Ce0e0a27B09f2011eF0512669A0F76367A	

# Project Website

https://injective.com/

# Codebase

https://bscscan.com/address/0xa2b726b1145a4773f68593cf171187d8ebe4d495#contracts



## **SUMMARY**

Injective is a blockchain built for finance. Injective is the only blockchain where developers can find robust outof-the-box modules such as a completely decentralized orderbook that can be utilized to build a diverse array
of sophisticated applications. Moreover, Injective is an open interoperable smart contracts platform. Injective
is built using the Cosmos SDK and is able to attain instant transaction finality using the Tendermint proof-ofstake consensus framework. In addition, Injective can facilitate fast cross-chain transactions across the
largest layer one networks such as Ethereum and Cosmos Hub. The Injective ecosystem is a network of
decentralized applications that focus on providing the best in class user experience. By providing the
unrestricted and unprecedented ability to access decentralized financial markets, products, services and
toolings, the ecosystem is striving to empower individuals with the ability to more efficiently allocate capital.

## Contract Summary

#### **Documentation Quality**

Injective Protocol provides a very good documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided clearly and structured and also dont have any high risk issue.

#### **Code Quality**

The Overall quality of the basecode is standard.

 Standard solidity basecode and rules are already followed by Injective Protocol with the discovery of several low issues.

#### **Test Coverage**

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

## Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-101 | It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently on lines 260, 351, 260 and 351.
- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 9, 95, 239, 321 and 474.



# CONCLUSION

We have audited the Injective Protocol project released on October 2020 to discover issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in Injective Protocol Project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes which might be found in the smart contract.

The security audit report provides satisfactory results with low-risk issues.

The issues found in the Injective Protocol smart contract code do not pose a considerable risk. The writing of the contract is close to the standard of writing contracts in general. The low-risk issues are some arithmetic operation issues, and a floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". Specifying a fixed compiler version is recommended to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.



# **AUDIT RESULT**

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	PASS	
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	ISSUE FOUND	
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.	ne PASS	
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.		
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.	call should be PASS	
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.	PASS	
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.		
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.		
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.	PASS	
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.		
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.	PASS	
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118	Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.	
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.	
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124	The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.	
Incorrect Inheritance Order	SWC-125	When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.	
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126	Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.	
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.	
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.	
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.	
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	



# **SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

Started	Monday Oct 19 2020 21:35:34 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Tuesday Oct 20 2020 21:28:07 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Standard
Main Source File	BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

# Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	COMPILER-REWRITABLE " <uint> - 1" DISCOVERED</uint>	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	COMPILER-REWRITABLE " <uint> - 1" DISCOVERED</uint>	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

**LINE 260** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
259 constructor(address _logic, bytes memory _data) public payable {
260   assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT ==
   bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
261   _setImplementation(_logic);
262   if(_data.length > 0) {
263   // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
264
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

**LINE 351** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
350 constructor(address _logic, address _admin, bytes memory _data) public payable
UpgradeableProxy(_logic, _data) {
351    assert(_ADMIN_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.admin")) - 1));
352    _setAdmin(_admin);
353    }
354
355
```



# SWC-101 | COMPILER-REWRITABLE "<UINT> - 1" DISCOVERED

**LINE 260** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
259   constructor(address _logic, bytes memory _data) public payable {
260   assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT ==
   bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
261   _setImplementation(_logic);
262   if(_data.length > 0) {
263   // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
264
```



# SWC-101 | COMPILER-REWRITABLE "<UINT> - 1" DISCOVERED

**LINE 351** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
350 constructor(address _logic, address _admin, bytes memory _data) public payable
UpgradeableProxy(_logic, _data) {
351    assert(_ADMIN_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.admin")) - 1));
352    _setAdmin(_admin);
353    }
354
355
```



LINE 9

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
8
9  pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
10
11  /**
12  * @dev This abstract contract provides a fallback function that delegates all calls to another contract using the EVM
13
```



LINE 95

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.2"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
94
95 pragma solidity ^0.6.2;
96
97 /**
98 * @dev Collection of functions related to the address type
99
```



**LINE 239** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
238
239 pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
240
241
242
243
```



**LINE 321** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
320
321 pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
322
323
324 /**
325
```



**LINE 474** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- BEP20UpgradeableProxy.sol

```
473
474 pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
475
476
477 contract BEP20UpgradeableProxy is TransparentUpgradeableProxy {
478
```



# **DISCLAIMER**

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This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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# **ABOUT US**

Sysfixed is a blockchain security certification organization established in 2021 with the objective to provide smart contract security services and verify their correctness in blockchain-based protocols. Sysfixed automatically scans for security vulnerabilities in Ethereum and other EVM-based blockchain smart contracts. Sysfixed a comprehensive range of analysis techniques—including static analysis, dynamic analysis, and symbolic execution—can accurately detect security vulnerabilities to provide an in-depth analysis report. With a vibrant ecosystem of world-class integration partners that amplify developer productivity, Sysfixed can be utilized in all phases of your project's lifecycle. Our team of security experts is dedicated to the research and improvement of our tools and techniques used to fortify your code.