



CasolCoin

Smart Contract Audit Report

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Audited Details

- Audited Project
- Blockchain
- Addresses
- Project Website
- Codebase

Summary

- Contract Summary
- Audit Findings Summary
- Vulnerabilities Summary

Conclusion

Audit Results

Smart Contract Analysis

- Detected Vulnerabilities

Disclaimer

About Us

AUDITED DETAILS

Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain
CasolCoin	CSL	Ethereum

Addresses

Contract address	0xd7019c4A51956eb176e8dc9Fb8B5368D0B1122f4
Contract deployer address	0x5cf07C4e7aDe7632CCb2f9d233a7Ce1A95D39e72

Project Website

<https://casolcoin.io/>

Codebase

<https://etherscan.io/address/0xd7019c4A51956eb176e8dc9Fb8B5368D0B1122f4#code>

SUMMARY

CasolCoin is a community token that purposely aims to change our energy consumption. In a context marked by the acceleration of climate change, the energy transition is more than ever the priority. This means sustainably transforming our habits and behaviours. Because energy renovation is everyone's business, CasolCoin wants to give more by building a blockchain ecosystem. Community tokens are levers for the community and to finance actions to save energy.

Contract Summary

Documentation Quality

CasolCoin provides a very poor documentation with standard of solidity base code.

- The technical description is provided unclear and disorganized.

Code Quality

The Overall quality of the basecode is poor.

- Solidity basecode and rules are unclear and disorganized by CasolCoin.

Test Coverage

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-100 SWC-108 | Explicitly define visibility for all state variables on lines 95 and 97.
- SWC-101 | It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently on lines 445.
- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 19.
- SWC-110 SWC-123 | It is recommended to use of revert(), assert(), and require() in Solidity, and the new REVERT opcode in the EVM on lines 81.

CONCLUSION

We have audited the CasolCoin project released in November 2022 to find issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in the CasolCoin project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes that may be found in smart contracts.

The security audit report gave unsatisfactory results with the discovery of high-risk issues and several other low-risk issues.

Writing a contract that does not follow the Solidity style guide can pose a significant risk. The high risk problem we found is the arithmetic operator can overflow, and it is possible to cause an integer overflow in the arithmetic operation. Whereas Low risk Issues we found are a floating pragma is set, state variable visibility is not set and an assertion violation was triggered. It is possible to cause an assertion violation. Solidity `assert()` statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use `require()` instead of `assert()` if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

AUDIT RESULT

Article	Category	Description	Result
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	ISSUE FOUND
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	ISSUE FOUND
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.	PASS
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.	ISSUE FOUND
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.	PASS
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.	PASS
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.	PASS
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.	PASS
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.	PASS
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.	ISSUE FOUND
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.	PASS
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS

DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	PASS
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	PASS
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	PASS
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	PASS
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	PASS
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118	Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.	PASS
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.	PASS
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	PASS
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124	The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.	PASS
Incorrect Inheritance Order	SWC-125	When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.	PASS
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126	Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.	PASS
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS

Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	PASS
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.	PASS
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	PASS
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	PASS
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	Using <code>abi.encodePacked()</code> with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.	PASS
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The <code>transfer()</code> and <code>send()</code> functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.	PASS
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	PASS

SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS

Started	Saturday Nov 05 2022 09:30:29 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Sunday Nov 06 2022 18:01:16 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Standard
Main Source File	MainToken.sol

Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATION CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-108	STATE VARIABLE VISIBILITY IS NOT SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-108	STATE VARIABLE VISIBILITY IS NOT SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-110	AN ASSERTION VIOLATION WAS TRIGGERED.	low	acknowledged

SWC-101 | THE ARITHMETIC OPERATION CAN OVERFLOW.

LINE 445

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an arithmetic overflow. Prevent the overflow by constraining inputs using the `require()` statement or use the OpenZeppelin SafeMath library for integer arithmetic operations. Refer to the transaction trace generated for this issue to reproduce the overflow.

Source File

- MainToken.sol

Locations

```
444 function getFreezing(address _addr, uint _index) public view returns (uint64
_release, uint _balance) {
445   for (uint i = 0; i < _index + 1; i++) {
446     _release = chains[toKey(_addr, _release)];
447     if (_release == 0) {
448       return;
449     }
```

SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.

LINE 19

low SEVERITY

The current pragma Solidity directive is `""^0.4.23""`. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source File

- MainToken.sol

Locations

```
18  */
19  pragma solidity ^0.4.23;
20
21
22  /**
23
```

SWC-108 | STATE VARIABLE VISIBILITY IS NOT SET.

LINE 95

low SEVERITY

It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "balances" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

Source File

- MainToken.sol

Locations

```
94
95 mapping(address => uint256) balances;
96
97 uint256 totalSupply_;
98
99
```

SWC-108 | STATE VARIABLE VISIBILITY IS NOT SET.

LINE 97

low SEVERITY

It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "totalSupply_" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

Source File

- MainToken.sol

Locations

```
96
97  uint256 totalSupply_;
98
99  /**
100   * @dev total number of tokens in existence
101
```

SWC-110 | AN ASSERTION VIOLATION WAS TRIGGERED.

LINE 81

low SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an assertion violation. Note that Solidity `assert()` statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use `require()` instead of `assert()` if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

Source File

- MainToken.sol

Locations

```
80  c = a + b;  
81  assert(c >= a);  
82  return c;  
83  }  
84  }  
85
```

DISCLAIMER

This report is subject to the terms and conditions (including without limitation, description of services, confidentiality, disclaimer and limitation of liability) set forth in the Services Agreement, or the scope of services, and terms and conditions provided to you (“Customer” or the “Company”) in connection with the Agreement. This report provided in connection with the Services set forth in the Agreement shall be used by the Company only to the extent permitted under the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement. This report may not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to, or relied upon by any person for any purposes, nor may copies be delivered to any other person other than the Company, without Sysfixed’s prior written consent in each instance.

This report is not, nor should be considered, an “endorsement” or “disapproval” of any particular project or team. This report is not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any “product” or “asset” created by any team or project that contracts Sysfixed to perform a security assessment. This report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technologies proprietors, business, business model, or legal compliance.

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn’t say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report in no way provides investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort. This report represents an extensive assessing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

This report is provided for information purposes only and on a non-reliance basis and does not constitute investment advice. No one shall have any right to rely on the report or its contents, and Sysfixed and its affiliates (including holding companies, shareholders, subsidiaries, employees, directors, officers, and other representatives) (Sysfixed) owe no duty of care.

ABOUT US

Sysfixed is a blockchain security certification organization established in 2021 with the objective to provide smart contract security services and verify their correctness in blockchain-based protocols. Sysfixed automatically scans for security vulnerabilities in Ethereum and other EVM-based blockchain smart contracts. Sysfixed a comprehensive range of analysis techniques—including static analysis, dynamic analysis, and symbolic execution—can accurately detect security vulnerabilities to provide an in-depth analysis report. With a vibrant ecosystem of world-class integration partners that amplify developer productivity, Sysfixed can be utilized in all phases of your project's lifecycle. Our team of security experts is dedicated to the research and improvement of our tools and techniques used to fortify your code.