

**BEAN.SecondLive** 

Smart Contract Audit Report





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# **AUDITED DETAILS**

### Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain	
BEAN.SecondLive	BEAN	Binance Smart Chain	

## Addresses

Contract address	0x07da81e9a684ab87fad7206b3bc8d0866f48cc7c	
Contract deployer address	0x2e637162072877a28D33a4f155B8a5E5E1Ac0293	

### Project Website

https://secondlive.world/

### Codebase

https://bscscan.com/address/0x07da81e9a684ab87fad7206b3bc8d0866f48cc7c#code



### **SUMMARY**

MissecondLive is a hub for Metaverse inhabitants. More than 1 million users are gathering here to facilitate self-expression, unleash creativity and build a dreaming parallel universe. Led invested by Binance Labs, the SecondLive team is expertise in virtual space creation for large-scale events and Metaverse infrastructure building. With the assistance of UGC and Al-generated content, SecondLive will create a Web3 open Metaverse that serves 1 billion people. There are four main modules in the process of using SecondLive.

### Contract Summary

#### **Documentation Quality**

BEAN.SecondLive provides a very good documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided clearly and structured and also dont have any high risk issue.

#### **Code Quality**

The Overall quality of the basecode is standard.

 Standard solidity basecode and rules are already followed by BEAN. SecondLive with the discovery of several low issues.

#### **Test Coverage**

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

### Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-101 | It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently on lines 362, 452, 362 and 452.
- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 57, 151, 336, 412 and 567.



## CONCLUSION

We have audited the BEAN.SecondLive project was released on December 2021 to discover issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in BEAN.SecondLive Project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes which might be found in the smart contract.

The security audit report provides a satisfactory result with some low-risk issues.

The issues found in the BEAN.SecondLive smart contract codes do not pose a considerable risk. The writing of the contract is close to the standard of writing contracts in general. The low-risk issues found are some arithmetic operation issues, and a floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.00.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.



# **AUDIT RESULT**

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	PASS	
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	ISSUE FOUND	
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.		
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.		
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.		
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.		
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.		
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.		
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.		
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.		
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used. PASS		
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118	Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.	
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.	
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124	The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.	
Incorrect Inheritance Order	SWC-125	When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.	
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126	Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.	
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.	
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.	
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.	
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	



# **SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

Started	Thursday Dec 23 2021 04:07:30 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Friday Dec 24 2021 10:28:24 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Standard
Main Source File	SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

## Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	COMPILER-REWRITABLE " <uint> - 1" DISCOVERED</uint>	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	COMPILER-REWRITABLE " <uint> - 1" DISCOVERED</uint>	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged



## SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

**LINE 362** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
361 */
362 function _implementation() internal view virtual override returns (address impl) {
363 bytes32 slot = _IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT;
364 // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
365 assembly {
366
```



## SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

**LINE 452** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
451 } else {
452 _fallback();
453 }
454 }
455
456
```



## SWC-101 | COMPILER-REWRITABLE "<UINT> - 1" DISCOVERED

**LINE 362** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
361 */
362 function _implementation() internal view virtual override returns (address impl) {
363 bytes32 slot = _IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT;
364 // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
365 assembly {
366
```



## SWC-101 | COMPILER-REWRITABLE "<UINT> - 1" DISCOVERED

**LINE 452** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
451 } else {
452 _fallback();
453 }
454 }
455
456
```



LINE 57

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
56 *
57 * This function does not return to its internal call site, it will return directly to the external caller.
58 */
59 function _delegate(address implementation) internal virtual {
60 // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
61
```



**LINE 151** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.2<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
function isContract(address account) internal view returns (bool) {

151  // This method relies on extcodesize, which returns 0 for contracts in

152  // construction, since the code is only stored at the end of the

153  // constructor execution.

154

155
```



**LINE 336** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
335 *
336 * If `_data` is nonempty, it's used as data in a delegate call to `_logic`. This will typically be an encoded
337 * function call, and allows initializating the storage of the proxy like a Solidity constructor.
338 */
339 constructor(address _logic, bytes memory _data) public payable {
340
```



**LINE 412** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
411 * that call matches one of the admin functions exposed by the proxy itself.
412 * 2. If the admin calls the proxy, it can access the admin functions, but its calls will never be forwarded to the
413 * implementation. If the admin tries to call a function on the implementation it will fail with an error that says
414 * "admin cannot fallback to proxy target".
415 *
416
```



**LINE 567** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- SecondLiveBeanProxy.sol

```
566 }
567 }
568
```



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This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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Sysfixed is a blockchain security certification organization established in 2021 with the objective to provide smart contract security services and verify their correctness in blockchain-based protocols. Sysfixed automatically scans for security vulnerabilities in Ethereum and other EVM-based blockchain smart contracts. Sysfixed a comprehensive range of analysis techniques—including static analysis, dynamic analysis, and symbolic execution—can accurately detect security vulnerabilities to provide an in-depth analysis report. With a vibrant ecosystem of world-class integration partners that amplify developer productivity, Sysfixed can be utilized in all phases of your project's lifecycle. Our team of security experts is dedicated to the research and improvement of our tools and techniques used to fortify your code.