

Bankless Token
Smart Contract
Audit Report





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# **AUDITED DETAILS**

## Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain	
Bankless Token	BANK	Polygon Matic	

## Addresses

Contract address	0xdb7cb471dd0b49b29cab4a1c14d070f27216a0ab	
Contract deployer address	0x63ec5767F54F6943750A70eB6117EA2D9Ca77313	

## Project Website

https://www.bankless.community/

## Codebase

https://polygonscan.com/address/0xdb7cb471dd0b49b29cab4a1c14d070f27216a0ab#code



## **SUMMARY**

BANK, the governance token of Bankless DAO, was distributed via fair launch to the Bankless nation. Of the one billion total BANK, 30% was allocated to the genesis treasury, 40% distributed to a vesting community treasury, and 30% retroactively to Bankless community members. These include 2020 or 2021 Bankless Badge holders, BAPO owners, or Bankless Gitcoin Grant donors

## Contract Summary

#### **Documentation Quality**

Bankless Token provides a very poor documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided unclear and disorganized.

#### **Code Quality**

The Overall quality of the basecode is poor.

• Solidity basecode and rules are unclear and disorganized by Bankless Token.

#### **Test Coverage**

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

## Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-110 SWC-123 | It is recommended to use of revert(), assert(), and require() in Solidity, and the new REVERT opcode in the EVM on lines 24.
- SWC-112 | Use delegatecall with caution and make sure to never call into untrusted contracts on lines 24.



## CONCLUSION

We have audited the Bankless Token project released on July 2021 to find issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in the Bankless Token project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes that may be found in smart contracts.

The security audit report yielded unsatisfactory results, discovering high-risk and low-risk issues.

Writing a contract that does not follow the Solidity style guide can pose a significant risk. The high risk issue found is that the smart contract delegates execution to a user-supplied address. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of this contract account and manipulate the state of the contract account or execute actions on its behalf. The low risk issue found is that a requirement was violated in a nested call, and the call was reverted as a result. Ensure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

We were recommended to keep being aware of investing in this risky smart contract.



# **AUDIT RESULT**

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	PASS	
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	PASS	
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.	PASS	
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.	PASS	
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.	PASS	
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.	ct. PASS	
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.	PASS	
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.	ved PASS	
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.	PASS	
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a ISSU failing assert statement.		
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.	PASS	
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	ISSUE FOUND	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.		
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.		
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	PASS	
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	PASS	
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.		
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118	Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.		
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.		
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	PASS	
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124	The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.		
Incorrect Inheritance Order	SWC-125	When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.		
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126	Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.	PASS	
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS	



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	PASS	
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.		
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	PASS	
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.		
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.		
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.		
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	PASS	



# **SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

Started	Monday Jul 19 2021 19:16:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Finished	Tuesday Jul 20 2021 23:56:44 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Mode	Standard		
Main Source File	UChildERC20Proxy.sol		

# Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-112	THE CONTRACT DELEGATES EXECUTION TO ANOTHER CONTRACT WITH A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS.	high	acknowledged
SWC-123	REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.	low	acknowledged



# SWC-112 | THE CONTRACT DELEGATES EXECUTION TO ANOTHER CONTRACT WITH A USER-SUPPLIED ADDRESS.

LINE 24

#### high SEVERITY

The smart contract delegates execution to a user-supplied address. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of this contract account and manipulate the state of the contract account or execute actions on its behalf.

#### Source File

- UChildERC20Proxy.sol

#### Locations

```
23 assembly {
24 let result := delegatecall(
25 sub(gas(), 10000),
26 _dst,
27 add(_calldata, 0x20),
28
```



# SWC-123 | REQUIREMENT VIOLATION.

LINE 24

#### **low SEVERITY**

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

#### Source File

- UChildERC20Proxy.sol

#### Locations

```
23 assembly {
24 let result := delegatecall(
25 sub(gas(), 10000),
26 _dst,
27 add(_calldata, 0x20),
28
```



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This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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# **ABOUT US**

Sysfixed is a blockchain security certification organization established in 2021 with the objective to provide smart contract security services and verify their correctness in blockchain-based protocols. Sysfixed automatically scans for security vulnerabilities in Ethereum and other EVM-based blockchain smart contracts. Sysfixed a comprehensive range of analysis techniques—including static analysis, dynamic analysis, and symbolic execution—can accurately detect security vulnerabilities to provide an in-depth analysis report. With a vibrant ecosystem of world-class integration partners that amplify developer productivity, Sysfixed can be utilized in all phases of your project's lifecycle. Our team of security experts is dedicated to the research and improvement of our tools and techniques used to fortify your code.