

Billiard Crypto Reward
Smart Contract
Audit Report





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AUDITED DETAILS

Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain
Billiard Crypto Reward	BICR	Binance Smart Chain

Addresses

Contract address	0xedbac1830c1b3280882c73449198ebf6a35ede43
Contract deployer address	0xA7618C49B0C419969F012B3e44a6DA9281744cc3

Project Website

https://billiardcrypto.com/

Codebase

https://bscscan.com/address/0xedbac1830c1b3280882c73449198ebf6a35ede43#code



SUMMARY

Billiard Crypto is a simple game, but it takes players a lot of practice to get used to it. The primary operations are drag and drop and correct angles. Different game modes, such as Solo, PvP, and Tournament, will be released gradually according to the schedule.

Contract Summary

Documentation Quality

Billiard Crypto Reward provides a very good documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided clearly and structured and also dont have any high risk issue.

Code Quality

The Overall quality of the basecode is standard.

Standard solidity basecode and rules are already followed by Billiard Crypto Reward with the discovery
of several low issues.

Test Coverage

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-100 SWC-108 | Explicitly define visibility for all state variables on lines 453.
- SWC-101 | It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently on lines 198, 220, 245, 276, 277, 292, 293, 315, 316, 460, 460, 529, 539, 550, 580, 589, 595, 604, 604, 611, 615, 615, 635, 636, 636, 638, 644, 645, 645, 647, 647, 655, 707, 707, 728, 736, 749, 767 and 770.
- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 11.
- SWC-110 SWC-123 | It is recommended to use of revert(), assert(), and require() in Solidity, and the new REVERT opcode in the EVM on lines 667, 668, 750, 768 and 771.
- SWC-120 | It is recommended to use external sources of randomness via oracles on lines 580 and 714.



CONCLUSION

We have audited the Billiard Crypto Reward project released on February 2023 to discover issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in Billiard Crypto Reward Project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes which might be found in the smart contract.

The security audit report provides satisfactory results with low-risk issues.

The issues found in the NamaFile smart contract code do not pose a considerable risk. The writing of the contract is close to the standard of writing contracts in general. The low-risk issues found are some arithmetic operation issues, a floating pragma is set, a state variable visibility is not set, the potential use of "block.number" as a source of randomness, and out-of-bounds array access which the index access expression can cause an exception in case of the use of an invalid array index value. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.17"". Specifying a fixed compiler version is recommended to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code. It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "IERCliquidityPairToken" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private. Potential use of "block.number" as a source of randomness, the environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number, and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also, keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness; be aware that using these variables introduces a certain level of trust in miners.



AUDIT RESULT

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	ISSUE FOUND	
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	ISSUE FOUND	
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.	f the PASS	
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.	ISSUE FOUND	
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.		
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.		
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.		
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.		
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.	PASS	
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a ISSU failing assert statement. FOUN		
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.	PASS	
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	PASS
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	PASS
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	PASS
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	PASS
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118		PASS
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119 State variables should not be shadowed.		PASS
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	ISSUE FOUND
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124	The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.	PASS
Incorrect Inheritance Order	SWC-125	When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.	PASS
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126	Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract.	PASS
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.	
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133		PASS
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.	
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	PASS



SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS

Started	Monday Feb 20 2023 21:05:16 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Finished	Tuesday Feb 21 2023 08:06:48 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Mode	Standard		
Main Source File	BilliardCryptoReward.sol		

Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+=" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+=" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+=" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-=" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "**" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged



SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged



SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "**" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "++" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "++" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "++" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-108	STATE VARIABLE VISIBILITY IS NOT SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-110	OUT OF BOUNDS ARRAY ACCESS	low	acknowledged
SWC-110	OUT OF BOUNDS ARRAY ACCESS	low	acknowledged
SWC-110	OUT OF BOUNDS ARRAY ACCESS	low	acknowledged
SWC-110	OUT OF BOUNDS ARRAY ACCESS	low	acknowledged
SWC-110	OUT OF BOUNDS ARRAY ACCESS	low	acknowledged
SWC-120	POTENTIAL USE OF "BLOCK.NUMBER" AS SOURCE OF RANDOMNESS.	low	acknowledged
SWC-120	POTENTIAL USE OF "BLOCK.NUMBER" AS SOURCE OF RANDOMNESS.	low	acknowledged



LINE 198

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
197  require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance");
198  _approve(sender, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount);
199
200  return true;
201  }
202
```



LINE 220

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
219 {
220    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, _allowances[_msgSender()][spender] + addedValue);
221    return true;
222  }
223
224
```



LINE 245

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
244    require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance below
zero");
245    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, currentAllowance - subtractedValue);
246
247    return true;
248  }
249
```



LINE 276

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
275    require(senderBalance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance");
276    _balances[sender] = senderBalance - amount;
277    _balances[recipient] += amount;
278
279    emit Transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
280
```



LINE 277

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
_balances[sender] = senderBalance - amount;

_balances[recipient] += amount;

278

279   emit Transfer(sender, recipient, amount);

280  }

281
```



LINE 292

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
291
292  _totalSupply += amount;
293  _balances[account] += amount;
294  emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
295  }
296
```



LINE 293

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
__totalSupply += amount;

293    __balances[account] += amount;

294    emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);

295    }

296

297
```



LINE 315

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
require(accountBalance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");

local balances[account] = accountBalance - amount;

local balances[account] = accountBalance - amount;

local burn amount exceeds balance");

local burn amount;

local burn amount exceeds balance");

local burn amount;

local bur
```



LINE 316

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
315   _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount;
316   _totalSupply -= amount;
317
318   emit Transfer(account, address(0), amount);
319  }
320
```



LINE 460

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
459
460 uint256 public tokenLiquidityThreshold = 1e4 * 10**18;
461
462 uint256 public genesis_block;
463 uint256 private deadline = 1;
464
```



LINE 460

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
459
460 uint256 public tokenLiquidityThreshold = 1e4 * 10**18;
461
462 uint256 public genesis_block;
463 uint256 private deadline = 1;
464
```



LINE 529

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance");
   _approve(sender, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount);

return true;
}
```



LINE 539

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
538 {
539    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, _allowances[_msgSender()][spender] + addedValue);
540    return true;
541  }
542
543
```



LINE 550

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
549 require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance below
zero");
550 _approve(_msgSender(), spender, currentAllowance - subtractedValue);
551
552 return true;
553 }
554
```



LINE 580

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
!exemptFee[recipient] &&
580 block.number < genesis_block + deadline;
581
582  //set fee to zero if fees in contract are handled or exempted
583 if (_interlock || exemptFee[sender] || exemptFee[recipient])
584</pre>
```



LINE 589

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
588 feeswap =
589 sellTaxes.liquidity +
590 sellTaxes.marketing;
591 feesum = feeswap;
592 currentTaxes = sellTaxes;
593
```



LINE 595

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
feeswap =
feeswap =
feeswap.
taxes.liquidity +
feesum.right
feesum = feeswap;
feesum = feeswap;
feesum.right
feeswap = feeswap = feeswap;
feesum.right
feeswap = feeswap = feeswap;
feesum.right
feeswap = feeswap;
feesum.right
feeswap = feeswap;
feeswap = feeswa
```



LINE 604

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
603
604 fee = (amount * feesum) / 100;
605
606 //send fees if threshold has been reached
607 //don't do this on buys, breaks swap
608
```



LINE 604

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
603
604 fee = (amount * feesum) / 100;
605
606 //send fees if threshold has been reached
607 //don't do this on buys, breaks swap
608
```



LINE 611

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
610  //rest to recipient
611  super._transfer(sender, recipient, amount - fee);
612  if (fee > 0) {
613   //send the fee to the contract
614  if (feeswap > 0) {
615
```



LINE 615

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
614 if (feeswap > 0) {
615  uint256 feeAmount = (amount * feeswap) / 100;
616  super._transfer(sender, address(this), feeAmount);
617  }
618
619
```



LINE 615

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
614 if (feeswap > 0) {
615   uint256 feeAmount = (amount * feeswap) / 100;
616   super._transfer(sender, address(this), feeAmount);
617  }
618
619
```



LINE 635

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
// Split the contract balance into halves
uint256 denominator = feeswap * 2;
uint256 tokensToAddLiquidityWith = (contractBalance * swapTaxes.liquidity) /
denominator;
uint256 toSwap = contractBalance - tokensToAddLiquidityWith;
```



LINE 636

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
uint256 denominator = feeswap * 2;
uint256 tokensToAddLiquidityWith = (contractBalance * swapTaxes.liquidity) /
denominator;
uint256 toSwap = contractBalance - tokensToAddLiquidityWith;
```



LINE 636

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
uint256 denominator = feeswap * 2;
uint256 tokensToAddLiquidityWith = (contractBalance * swapTaxes.liquidity) /
denominator;
uint256 toSwap = contractBalance - tokensToAddLiquidityWith;
```



LINE 638

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
637 denominator;
638 uint256 toSwap = contractBalance - tokensToAddLiquidityWith;
639
640 uint256 initialBalance = IERCliquidityPairToken.balanceOf(address(liquifier));
641
642
```



LINE 644

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
643
644  uint256 deltaBalance = IERCliquidityPairToken.balanceOf(address(liquifier)) -
initialBalance;
645  uint256 unitBalance = deltaBalance / (denominator - swapTaxes.liquidity);
646
647  uint256 marketingAmt = unitBalance * 2 * swapTaxes.marketing;
648
```



LINE 645

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
644   uint256 deltaBalance = IERCliquidityPairToken.balanceOf(address(liquifier)) -
initialBalance;
645   uint256 unitBalance = deltaBalance / (denominator - swapTaxes.liquidity);
646
647   uint256 marketingAmt = unitBalance * 2 * swapTaxes.marketing;
648   if (marketingAmt > 0) {
649
```



LINE 645

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
644   uint256 deltaBalance = IERCliquidityPairToken.balanceOf(address(liquifier)) -
initialBalance;
645   uint256 unitBalance = deltaBalance / (denominator - swapTaxes.liquidity);
646
647   uint256 marketingAmt = unitBalance * 2 * swapTaxes.marketing;
648   if (marketingAmt > 0) {
649
```



LINE 647

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
646
647  uint256 marketingAmt = unitBalance * 2 * swapTaxes.marketing;
648  if (marketingAmt > 0) {
649   IERCliquidityPairToken.transferFrom(address(liquifier), marketingWallet,
marketingAmt);
650  }
651
```



LINE 647

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
646
647  uint256 marketingAmt = unitBalance * 2 * swapTaxes.marketing;
648  if (marketingAmt > 0) {
649   IERCliquidityPairToken.transferFrom(address(liquifier), marketingWallet,
marketingAmt);
650  }
651
```



LINE 655

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
654
655  uint256 ethPairToAddLiquidityWith = unitBalance * swapTaxes.liquidity;
656  if (ethPairToAddLiquidityWith > 0) {
657   // Add liquidity to pancake
658  addLiquidity(tokensToAddLiquidityWith, ethPairToAddLiquidityWith);
659
```



LINE 707

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
706  require(new_amount <= 1e5, "Swap threshold amount should be lower or equal to 1% of
tokens");
707  tokenLiquidityThreshold = new_amount * 10**decimals();
708  }
709
710  function EnableTrading() external onlyOwner {
711</pre>
```



LINE 707

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
706  require(new_amount <= 1e5, "Swap threshold amount should be lower or equal to 1% of
tokens");
707  tokenLiquidityThreshold = new_amount * 10**decimals();
708  }
709
710  function EnableTrading() external onlyOwner {
711</pre>
```



LINE 728

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
727 taxes = Taxes(_marketing, _liquidity);
728 require((_marketing + _liquidity) <= 5, "Must keep fees at 5% or less");
729 }
730
731 function SetSellTaxes(
732</pre>
```



LINE 736

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
735  sellTaxes = Taxes(_marketing, _liquidity);
736  require((_marketing + _liquidity ) <= 5, "Must keep fees at 5% or less");
737  }
738
739  function updateMarketingWallet(address newWallet) external onlyOwner {
740</pre>
```



LINE 749

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
function bulkExemptFee(address[] memory accounts, bool state) external onlyOwner {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
  exemptFee[accounts[i]] = state;
}

for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
  exemptFee[accounts[i]] = state;
}
</pre>
```



LINE 767

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
766 ) public onlyOwner {
767  for (uint256 index; index < newAddr.length; index++) {
768  blackList[newAddr[index]] = true;
769 }
770  for (uint256 index; index < removedAddr.length; index++) {
771</pre>
```



LINE 770

low SEVERITY

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
769 }
770 for (uint256 index; index < removedAddr.length; index++) {
771 blackList[removedAddr[index]] = false;
772 }
773 }
774
```



SWC-103 | A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.

LINE 11

low SEVERITY

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.17"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
10
11 pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
12
13 abstract contract Context {
14 function _msgSender() internal view virtual returns (address) {
15
```



SWC-108 | STATE VARIABLE VISIBILITY IS NOT SET.

LINE 453

low SEVERITY

It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "IERCliquidityPairToken" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
452 address public liquidityPairToken;
453 IERC20 IERCliquidityPairToken;
454 Liquifier public liquifier;
455
456 bool private _interlock = false;
457
```



LINE 667

low SEVERITY

The index access expression can cause an exception in case of use of invalid array index value.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
address[] memory path = new address[](2);
path[0] = address(this);
path[1] = liquidityPairToken;

69
670    _approve(address(this), address(router), tokenAmount);
671
```



LINE 668

low SEVERITY

The index access expression can cause an exception in case of use of invalid array index value.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
path[0] = address(this);

668  path[1] = liquidityPairToken;

669

670  _approve(address(this), address(router), tokenAmount);

671

672
```



LINE 750

low SEVERITY

The index access expression can cause an exception in case of use of invalid array index value.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
749  for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
750   exemptFee[accounts[i]] = state;
751  }
752  }
753
754</pre>
```



LINE 768

low SEVERITY

The index access expression can cause an exception in case of use of invalid array index value.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
for (uint256 index; index < newAddr.length; index++) {
    768    blackList[newAddr[index]] = true;
    769    }
    770    for (uint256 index; index < removedAddr.length; index++) {
    771    blackList[removedAddr[index]] = false;
    772</pre>
```



LINE 771

low SEVERITY

The index access expression can cause an exception in case of use of invalid array index value.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
for (uint256 index; index < removedAddr.length; index++) {
    plackList[removedAddr[index]] = false;
    }
    }
    }
    773  }
    774
    775</pre>
```



SWC-120 | POTENTIAL USE OF "BLOCK.NUMBER" AS SOURCE OF RANDOMNESS.

LINE 580

low SEVERITY

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
579 !exemptFee[recipient] &&
580 block.number < genesis_block + deadline;
581
582  //set fee to zero if fees in contract are handled or exempted
583 if (_interlock || exemptFee[sender] || exemptFee[recipient])
584</pre>
```



SWC-120 | POTENTIAL USE OF "BLOCK.NUMBER" AS SOURCE OF RANDOMNESS.

LINE 714

low SEVERITY

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source File

- BilliardCryptoReward.sol

```
713 providingLiquidity = true;
714 genesis_block = block.number;
715 }
716
717 function updatedeadline(uint256 _deadline) external onlyOwner {
718
```



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