

MiniVerse Share
Smart Contract
Audit Report





# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

### | Audited Details

- Audited Project
- Blockchain
- Addresses
- Project Website
- Codebase

### Summary

- Contract Summary
- Audit Findings Summary
- Vulnerabilities Summary

### Conclusion

### | Audit Results

### Smart Contract Analysis

- Detected Vulnerabilities

### Disclaimer

### About Us



# **AUDITED DETAILS**

### Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain
MiniVerse Share	MSHARE	Fantom

# Addresses

Contract address	0xb011ec534d9175cd7a69afbfc1bcc9990862c462	
Contract deployer address	0xa608B11D3671D3Dc7BD45bfCd220fdcaA0D23351	

### Project Website

https://app.mvfinance.club/#/

### Codebase

https://ftmscan.com/address/0xb011ec534d9175cd7a69afbfc1bcc9990862c462#code



### **SUMMARY**

"MiniVerse Finance is an algorithmic stablecoin protocol pegged 1:1 to USDC on Fantom. Inspired by previous algorithmic stable protocols such as Basis Cash and Tomb Finance. Much like Tomb, our protocol uses three tokens (MvDOLLAR, MSHARE, MvBOND) to incentivize a stable 1:1 peg to USDC. The protocol's underlying mechanism dynamically adjusts MvDOLLAR's supply, pushing its price up or down relative to the price of USDC. This should be \$1 however there may be times when USDC loses its peg and if our protocol is functioning as intended will follow USDC to keep pegged 1:1 to i"

### Contract Summary

#### **Documentation Quality**

MiniVerse Share provides a very good documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided clearly and structured and also dont have any high risk issue.

#### **Code Quality**

The Overall quality of the basecode is standard.

• Standard solidity basecode and rules are already followed by MiniVerse Share with the discovery of several low issues.

#### **Test Coverage**

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

### Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-101 | It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently on lines 31, 43, 56, 57, 68, 78, 92, 109, 124, 125, 143, 160, 178, 198, 218 and 829.
- SWC-103 | Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended on lines 9, 225, 251, 330, 636, 678 and 685.



# CONCLUSION

We have audited the MiniVerse Share project released in February 2022 to discover issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in MiniVerse Share Project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes which might be found in the smart contract.

The security audit report provides a satisfactory result with some low-risk issues.

The issues found in the MiniVerse Share smart contract code do not pose a considerable risk. The writing of the contract is close to the standard of writing contracts in general. The low-risk issues found are some arithmetic operation issues, a floating pragma is set, and it is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.



# **AUDIT RESULT**

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	PASS	
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.		
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.		
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.	ISSUE FOUND	
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.		
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.		
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.		
Reentrancy	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.		PASS	
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109		PASS	
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.		
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used. PA		
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	PASS
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118	Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.	
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.	
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	
Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	SWC-124   user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage		PASS
Incorrect Inheritance Order  When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.		PASS	
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126 contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on		PASS
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	
Override control character	SWC-130	Malicious actors can use the Right-To-Left-Override unicode character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as to the real intent of a contract.	
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.	
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134	The transfer() and send() functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas.	
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136	It is a common misconception that private type variables cannot be read.	PASS



# **SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

Started	Friday Feb 25 2022 02:08:19 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Finished	Saturday Feb 26 2022 19:03:03 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Mode	Standard		
Main Source File	MvSHARE.sol		

# Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "%" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "*" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "%" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged



SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "%" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-101	ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged
SWC-103	A FLOATING PRAGMA IS SET.	low	acknowledged



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED

LINE 31

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
30  function tryAdd(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (bool, uint256) {
31   uint256 c = a + b;
32   if (c < a) return (false, 0);
33   return (true, c);
34  }
35</pre>
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

LINE 43

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
42  if (b > a) return (false, 0);
43  return (true, a - b);
44  }
45
46  /**
47
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "\*" DISCOVERED

LINE 56

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
55  if (a == 0) return (true, 0);
56  uint256 c = a * b;
57  if (c / a != b) return (false, 0);
58  return (true, c);
59  }
60
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED

LINE 57

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
56   uint256 c = a * b;
57   if (c / a != b) return (false, 0);
58   return (true, c);
59   }
60
61
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED

LINE 68

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
67  if (b == 0) return (false, 0);
68  return (true, a / b);
69  }
70
71  /**
72
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "%" DISCOVERED

LINE 78

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
77  if (b == 0) return (false, 0);
78  return (true, a % b);
79  }
80
81  /**
82
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED

LINE 92

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
91 function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
92  uint256 c = a + b;
93  require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");
94  return c;
95  }
96
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

**LINE 109** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "\*" DISCOVERED

**LINE 124** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
123  if (a == 0) return 0;
124  uint256 c = a * b;
125  require(c / a == b, "SafeMath: multiplication overflow");
126  return c;
127  }
128
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED

**LINE 125** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
124  uint256 c = a * b;
125  require(c / a == b, "SafeMath: multiplication overflow");
126  return c;
127  }
128
129
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED

**LINE 143** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
142 require(b > 0, "SafeMath: division by zero");
143 return a / b;
144 }
145
146 /**
147
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "%" DISCOVERED

**LINE 160** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
159 require(b > 0, "SafeMath: modulo by zero");
160 return a % b;
161 }
162
163 /**
164
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "-" DISCOVERED

**LINE 178** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
177  require(b <= a, errorMessage);
178  return a - b;
179  }
180
181  /**
182</pre>
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "/" DISCOVERED

**LINE 198** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
197  require(b > 0, errorMessage);
198  return a / b;
199  }
200
201  /**
202
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "%" DISCOVERED

**LINE 218** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
217 require(b > 0, errorMessage);
218 return a % b;
219 }
220 }
221
222
```



# SWC-101 | ARITHMETIC OPERATION "+" DISCOVERED

**LINE 829** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

This plugin produces issues to support false positive discovery within mythril.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
828  startTime = _startTime;
829  endTime = startTime + VESTING_DURATION;
830
831  communityFundLastClaimed = startTime;
832  devFundLastClaimed = startTime;
833
```



LINE 9

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
8
9  pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
10
11  /**
12  * @dev Wrappers over Solidity's arithmetic operations with added overflow
13</pre>
```



**LINE 225** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
224
225 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
226
227 /*
228 * @dev Provides information about the current execution context, including the
229
```



**LINE 251** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
250
251 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
252
253 /**
254 * @dev Interface of the ERC20 standard as defined in the EIP.
255
```



**LINE 330** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
329

330 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;

331

332

333 /**

334
```



**LINE 636** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
635
636 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
637
638
639 /**
640
```



**LINE 678** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
677
678 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
679
680
681 // File @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol@v3.4.2
682
```



**LINE 685** 

#### **low SEVERITY**

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

#### Source File

- MvSHARE.sol

```
684
685 pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;
686
687 /**
688 * @dev Contract module which provides a basic access control mechanism, where
689
```



### **DISCLAIMER**

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This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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