

Mango Man Intelligent
Smart Contract
Audit Report





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AUDITED DETAILS

Audited Project

Project name	Token ticker	Blockchain	
Mango Man Intelligent	MMIT	Binance Smart Chain	

Addresses

Contract address	0x9767c8e438aa18f550208e6d1fdf5f43541cc2c8
Contract deployer address	0x5Eb88A00f4848Ad7e488AdDb7d2e6ea1c918712C

Project Website

https://mmint.io/#

Codebase

https://bscscan.com/address/0x9767c8e438aa18f550208e6d1fdf5f43541cc2c8#code



SUMMARY

The genuine nature of the Mango Man coin has given it the kind of exposure it deserves. By authenticity, we mean there's no scope for fraud or forgery. This is ensured by a properly functioning application that takes in all relevant details from all the users while joining us. The meme coin is very transparent to its users! We make all the transactions available in front of all the users. All incoming and outgoing funds are highly transparent.

Contract Summary

Documentation Quality

Mango Man Intelligent provides a very poor documentation with standard of solidity base code.

• The technical description is provided unclear and disorganized.

Code Quality

The Overall quality of the basecode is poor.

• Solidity basecode and rules are unclear and disorganized by Mango Man Intelligent.

Test Coverage

Test coverage of the project is 100% (Through Codebase)

Audit Findings Summary

- SWC-101 | It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently on lines 571, 631, 645, 645, 562, 565 and 568.
- SWC-116 | It is recommended to use oracles for block values as a proxy for time on lines 631, 645, 645, 562, 565, 568 and 571.



CONCLUSION

We have audited the Mango Man Intelligent project released on May 2022 to find issues and identify potential security vulnerabilities in the Mango Man Intelligent project. This process is used to find technical issues and security loopholes that may be found in smart contracts.

The security audit report yielded unsatisfactory results, discovering high-risk and low-risk issues.

Writing a contract that does not follow the Solidity style guide can pose a significant risk. The serious and low problems we found in the smart contract are some arithmetic operators can overflow, and It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation. The low-risk issue is a control flow decision based on The block.timestamp environment variable. The block.timestamp environment variable determines a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number, and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also, keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness, and be aware that using these variables introduces a certain level of trust in miners.

We were recommended to keep being aware of investing in this risky smart contract.



AUDIT RESULT

Article	Category	Description	Result	
Default Visibility	SWC-100 SWC-108	Functions and state variables visibility should be set explicitly. Visibility levels should be specified consciously.	PASS	
Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC-101	If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.	ISSUE FOUND	
Outdated Compiler Version	SWC-102	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.		
Floating Pragma	SWC-103	Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.	PASS	
Unchecked Call Return Value	SWC-104	The return value of a message call should be checked.		
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	SWC-105	Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw from the contract.	PASS	
SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	SWC-106	The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.	PASS	
Reentrancy	SWC-107	Check effect interaction pattern should be followed if the code performs recursive call.	PASS	
Uninitialized Storage Pointer	SWC-109 Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract.		PASS	
Assert Violation	SWC-110 SWC-123	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.	PASS	
Deprecated Solidity Functions	SWC-111	Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.	PASS	
Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	SWC-112	Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.	PASS	



DoS (Denial of Service)	SWC-113 SWC-128	Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.	PASS
Race Conditions	SWC-114	Race Conditions and Transactions Order Dependency should not be possible.	PASS
Authorization through tx.origin	SWC-115	tx.origin should not be used for authorization.	PASS
Block values as a proxy for time	SWC-116	Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.	ISSUE FOUND
Signature Unique ID	SWC-117 SWC-121 SWC-122	Signed messages should always have a unique id. A transaction hash should not be used as a unique id.	PASS
Incorrect Constructor Name	SWC-118 Constructors are special functions that are called only once during the contract creation.		PASS
Shadowing State Variable	SWC-119	State variables should not be shadowed.	PASS
Weak Sources of Randomness	SWC-120	Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.	PASS
Storage Location SWC-124 authorized use		The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract accounts may write to sensitive storage locations.	PASS
Incorrect Inheritance Order		When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order. The rule of thumb is to inherit contracts from more /general/ to more /specific/.	PASS
Insufficient Gas Griefing	SWC-126 contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on		PASS
Arbitrary Jump Function	SWC-127	As Solidity doesnt support pointer arithmetics, it is impossible to change such variable to an arbitrary value.	PASS



Typographical Error	SWC-129	A typographical error can occur for example when the intent of a defined operation is to sum a number to a variable.	
Override control character	SWC-130 character to force RTL text rendering and confuse users as		PASS
Unused variables	SWC-131 SWC-135	Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue.	PASS
Unexpected Ether balance	SWC-132	Contracts can behave erroneously when they strictly assume a specific Ether balance.	
Hash Collisions Variable	SWC-133	SWC-133 Using abi.encodePacked() with multiple variable length arguments can, in certain situations, lead to a hash collision.	
Hardcoded gas amount	SWC-134		PASS
Unencrypted Private Data	SWC-136		PASS



SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS

Started	Friday May 13 2022 20:56:45 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Finished	Saturday May 14 2022 00:08:46 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)		
Mode	Standard		
Main Source File	MangoManIntelligent.sol		

Detected Issues

ID	Title	Severity	Status
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-101	THE ARITHMETIC OPERATOR CAN OVERFLOW.	high	acknowledged
SWC-116	A CONTROL FLOW DECISION IS MADE BASED ON THE BLOCK.TIMESTAMP ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE.	low	acknowledged
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LINE 571

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation.

Source File

- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
570 else{
571 require(block.timestamp >= _initialization + 360 hours, "ERC20: Token is locked");
572 }
573 _balances[sender] = _balances[sender].sub(amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance");
574 _balances[recipient] = _balances[recipient].add(amount);
575
```



LINE 631

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation.

Source File

- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
630  uint256 price = 121428571428;
631  require(block.timestamp <= _initialization + 72 hours, "Presale phase 1
completed!");
632  require(msg.sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
633
634  if(msg.sender==_developer){
635</pre>
```



LINE 645

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation.

Source File

- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
644  uint256 price = 60714285714;
645  require(block.timestamp <= _initialization + 14 days && block.timestamp >
  _initialization + 72 hours, "Presale phase 2 completed!");
646  require(msg.sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
647
648  if(msg.sender==_developer){
649
```



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647
648  if(msg.sender==_developer){
649
```



LINE 562

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation.

Source File

- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
if(sender==_developer){
  require(block.timestamp > _initialization + 180 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");
}
else if(sender==_liquidity){
  require(block.timestamp > _initialization + 360 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");
}
```



LINE 565

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation.

Source File

- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
else if(sender==_liquidity){
    require(block.timestamp > _initialization + 360 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");

    else if(sender==_oldTransferer){
        require(block.timestamp <= _initialization + 3 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");

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        require(block.timestamp <= _initialization + 3 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");</pre>
```



LINE 568

high SEVERITY

It is possible to cause an integer overflow or underflow in the arithmetic operation.

Source File

- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
567 else if(sender==_oldTransferer){
568    require(block.timestamp <= _initialization + 3 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");
569  }
570    else{
571    require(block.timestamp >= _initialization + 360 hours,"ERC20: Token is locked");
572
```



LINE 631

low SEVERITY

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

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```
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completed!");
632    require(msg.sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
633
634    if(msg.sender==_developer){
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```



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```
561 if(sender==_developer){
562  require(block.timestamp > _initialization + 180 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");
563  }
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565  require(block.timestamp > _initialization + 360 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");
566
```



LINE 565

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The block timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

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- MangoManIntelligent.sol

```
else if(sender==_liquidity){
   require(block.timestamp > _initialization + 360 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");

66 }

67 else if(sender==_oldTransferer){
   require(block.timestamp <= _initialization + 3 days,"ERC20: Token is locked");

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else if(sender==_oldTransferer){
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573 _balances[sender] = _balances[sender].sub(amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance");
574 _balances[recipient] = _balances[recipient].add(amount);
575
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This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as of the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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